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Ritter: The Ethnological Revolution: On Marcel Mauss

THE ETHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION:
ON MARCEL MAUSS*

HENNING RITTER

Alors que tout est en nuances . .. (Marcel Mauss)

In 1950, when a collection of studies entitled Sociology (md
Anlhropology appeared in fran ce. edited by the sociologist
Georges CU TvilCh and with an introductio n by the anthropologist
Claude Uvi-Strduss (who (cn years later achieved fa me as a
structuralis t), the nam e of its author. Marcel Mauss, was certain ly
generally well-known in sociological a nd ethno logical academ ic
circles. Yet it is equally certain thal scarcely anyone outside the
closest circle of his facul ty colleagues had ever taken note of a
publication by him , and that o f these o nly fe w held a true picture
orthe quality and exte nt or his work. Nor was t hat alall possible at
the time. For his on ly Ixx>k was some decades previo us, a coHee·
tion of essays on t he history of religion published in collaboration
with Hen ri Hubert (Milanges d'histoiTe religions,
des
1909). A sec·
and OOok, a manual of ethnography, which appeared in 1947.
consists of lectu re notes taken and edited by one of Mauss' SlUdents, Denise Pau lme. of leclUres on descriptive ethnography
which Mauss had given at the InstitUl d'Ethnologie between 1926
a nd 1939. Both books represent two important phases in Mauss'
research: the history or rather sociology of religion emanatin g
from the circle wh ich Emi le Durkheim had assembled around the
periodical L 'Annie socioiogique, and ethnologica l l"esearch emanci·
pated from the discipl ine and style of argument of the Durkheim
school, with which Mauss firm ly mou lded the fi rst generation of
French ethno logists. Certainly two im portant elements in the
life's work of Marcel Mauss; yet, in relatio n to the dimensio ns of
the subjects he dealt with , and wh ich are visible forlhe tirsttime in
*Translated from the German by J ohn Burns.
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the collections of essays mentioned. only a modest sample. When
in 1968/69 a three volume edition of ,he Oeuvres of Marcel Mauss
appeared, consisting of about 1500 pages in a systematically ordered presentation by Victor Karad y. an overview of Mauss'
complete output was made possible as it had been outl ined in 1950
by Levi-Strauss in his " 'ntroductio n to the Works of Marcel
Mau ss," using incomplete and uncertain textual sources.
This note on the editorial histor}' docs not of itself co nstitute

anything unu sual. That a scholar's work revea ls itself in research
which remains fragmentary, in book reviews, in essays buried in
scientific periodicals. in o rally transmitted hints and stimuli: all
th is belongs especially to the day to day routine of sc iemiyficall
productive d isciplines. The misreading of the consequences of
certain lines of inquiry and of anslversdeveloped in dewi l is, as an
ind ication of the resistance and sluggishness of established explanation and interpretation -a natural elemem. as it were, of the
process of acquiring knowledge . As Mauss himsclfpo illled outon
one occasion:
It is not alwa ys necessary to say everyth ing one thinks and it is by no
means <I sign ofa lack of candour to keep necessary. useful and inte resting working hypotheses foroneself. for research, at beSt for teaching and
for one's friend s. .. '

One cannot .suppose s uch semimeIHs to express the lazy
esoteric auilllde of ro utine institutiona l research when they are
seen in the light of Mauss' comment on the pathos of knowledge
within modem ethnology and anthropology:
Each day which passes without one·s collecting these fragments of humanit y is a cia}' lost. for the sciences of society. for the hislOry of man and
the une;,rthing of facts of which no one at this moment can say:lt whm
point they will find their use for philosophy and the consciousness which
humani!)' is gai ning or itselP

This pathos- laden programme of what Levi-Strauss calls "the
extension of reason" represems in Mauss' work a remarkable
combination of esote,·ic pattern s of research with scientific
routine tasks. There is no work by Mauss in which he valid ly
form ulates his theore tical perspective. The m~orit y o f his wri tings take the fo rm of reviews , the expression of an opi n ion on a
concre·tc detai l, no tes, sketches, which though prograinmatic, yet
always deal with currelll thinking on a speci fic problem. Even
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol22/iss22/2
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Mauss' independent scientific writings contai n lengthy passages
resembling more the review than the essay. The ou tward impression made by his ethnological writings, as for example the stud y
on Seasonal Change ill Eskimo Societies or on The Gifl, is remin iscent
more of a philological treatise than an ethnographical description
and analysis. The text is often overburdened by an apparatus of
references, source criticism and "add itional" notes which repulses
the reader like the devotions of a religiolls order, binding the
thought into a mesh of factual requirements from which it is hard
to free it.
It is, then, sur prising that Lkvi-Strauss sees already present in
these fragments of a work the e lements of the "novum org-anum"
of the soc ial sciences in the 20th century. He does not fail to
recognize that. for example, in Mauss' main work, The Gift, we are
presented with somet hing like a "rough note-book," " pages in no
order" Cull oC"impressionistic notes." But Uvi-$lrrauss also sees
in them inspired scholarship,
which in a seemingly ra ndom way draws on American. Indian. Celtic,
Greek and Oceanic evidence,n\'incing.
always cquallyco
Scarcely anyone
has been able to read Tilt Gift without c)(penencing the whole scale of
emotiOlls which Malebranche remembering his reading Descartes for the
firsl Lime desc ri bed so well: with beating heart and head pounding a still
indefinable but indispUiable cenainty thai one is present at an event
decisive for the development ofsc:icncc grips the rnind. 3

One may pau se here a mo ment to ascertain the nature of what. we
are dealin g with here. In the introductory remarks to his essay on
BachoCen, Walter Benjamin s peaks of "scielllific prophecies"
which are distinguishable fro m scientific predictions. They deserve to be denoted as sllch
because a more or less kee n sense of what is coming promotes resea rch
which in itself in no way leal'cs the general framework of science. Thai is
why these prophecies eli normam in special sllldies, which re main con·
cealed from the general public, and the authors ofwhidt in the majority
S<."arcely appear in the role of fore runners eilher in Iheir own eyes or in
those of posterity.-

How do such scientific prophecies reveal themselves, presentcd
as they a re nOI in prognostic statements, but as well-re hearsed
sc,ientific disco urse ? They are probabl y o nly recognizable in the
light of more gene ral changes in perce ption and attitude which
they seem to anticipate withou t d irectly having in flu enced these
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1990
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changes. As an example from wit hin the experiential horizon of
his generation Be njamin cites the sLUdies by two Vie nnese art
his to rians, Alo is Rin gl's Spatromische Krl nstindustrie and Franz
wickhorrs Wimer Genesis, which , witho ut tra nscending the
boundar)' of their science. anticipated what later e merged as
ex p ressionism . Viewed retrospectively, different fo rms of ex-

pression, scientific a nd a rtistic, may co mbine as elements in a
common in tellectua l cl imate , witho u t the simila rities becomi n g

apparent except ata historical distance
. This phenomenon , wh ich
is generall y fa miliar to the history of art as epocha l style and the

signature of the age , also concerns today the history of sc ience
uncleI' the rubric "the origin o f the new."
A special case of this ge neral problem wh ich is at present being
given greater attention is the con stellatio n of a scientific work. and
interpretatio n claiming for itsel f legitimacy as a precu rsor, in
o rder b y this refere nce to anchor an innovative theoretical conception in the tradition of a discipline. Most scientific d isci plines
know this t hrough aut hors and tex ts which , collected . codified,
and guaranteed a presence th rough interpretation , and are accorded hig h status as basic coo rdinates o f the d isciplines' theoret
ical work. T he remarkable t hing about the m is, as Michel Foucault
.
I
Ilas put It,
that they are not just the au thors of their works, their books. They have
created more: the possibility and t.he constituti\·e laws fo r other teXLS. J
T he e mphasis here is upon other texis, and , in a certain sense, the
,,"'ork o f such authors excels that which follows, eve n if they are
thus "outdated."
In o ur conception o f Mauss' work, and in its d iscovery by
Uvi-Strauss under the sig n of incipient structuralism , we are
c1earJydeaJin gwith both cases: a legitimizing refere nce to the past
and also a d istanced analysis of t he origin of t he new. The real
work of the author is the fou ndation of another· work, which , stil l
undefined, is just beginning to show through . The beginning of
Mauss' real work may be soug ht wit hin a research programm e
wi th which Emile Durkheim undertook to develop into a scientific
discipline t he socio logy for which he had provided a methodology. Durkheim's undertak in g rejects the numerous attempts at
defining a method for sociology since the end o f the 19th century
by meansoflhe adopr.ion of questions and material insigh ts from
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol22/iss22/2
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other disciplines and their application to specifically sociological
problems. The work of Durkheim and his school is, however. an
example of the risks which such a rejection entails: the danger lies
in allowing topics wh ich distract from the original object of study
to become the "center of gravity" of one's research. Thus it has
rightly been said of the Durkheim school that it took as starting
point the problems of contemporary society, yet ended up by not
dealing with them at all. What is meant is that within the sociology
of Durkheim and his school, from a certain point on, the question
of the history of religion and what were at the time called primi ~
live societies are accorded prime auemion. Of Durkheim himself
it is known that the problem of the sociology of religion became
evident to him only afte r his early main works on the division of
labour in society and the rules of sociological method. and it was
only after the appearance of his third main sociological work, the
study on suicide , that this new imerest began to make its scientific
mark.
h was 110( until 1895 1I.hal gained a dear insighl into the essential role
wh ich religion plays in social life. In that year I found for the first time
the means for a sociologicaltreatmem of religion. This was a revelation to
me. The
s lecture of 1895 [on religion) denote a hiatus in the develo pment
of my thought, and of such a kind that all my earlier research had to be
L~ke n up again, in order to bring it into line with the new insights. [This
re-oriemationJ resulted entirely in the studies o n the hislory of religion
which I had just undertaken . ..•

One might even speak of an infection of aU the questions of the
social theory of the presem by the problem of rel igion. This is all
the more surprising as Durkheim himself adopted a strictly lay
point-of-view and proceeded from an assumed weakening of the
religious factor in the course of modern social development.
Without his revising these convictions, the subject of religion
becomes of central sociological interest and detennines the for.
mulation of the main problems in Durkheim's sociology. How is
this jX)ssible? The decisive prerequisite for this re-orientation is
the conviction that a radical sociologizing of the problem of reli·
gion can be achieved through the analysis of the relationship of
religion and society in so-called primitive societies. and that , in
these, religion is the manifestation of collective consciousness, the
theoretical and practical definition of which in the presem is the
task of science. On the one hand, this includes a genetic thesis as to
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1990
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the or igin of modern secular institutio ns, pauerns of though t a nd
action . Durkheim fo rm ulates this aspect clearl y:
Religio
ntains
n co
from the very begin ning, though in aco nfused Slate, all
the elements which, by dissociating themseh'es in a Ihousand or more
ways, have gi\'cn rise [0 all the va rious manifestations of the collective life.
From myth and legend arose science and poetry; from religious or·
namc ntation and cult-ce remonies stem the fine a rts; law and morals are
born of ritual praclices. 1

Durkheim sees a simila r origin fo r philosophical ideas. kinshi p""
ties. punishme nt, contracts and gifts; o nly in the case o f economic
o rganizatio n does he make a provisional restriction.
The genetic thesis is complememed , on the other hand , by the
question whic h c haracterizes Durkheim's sociology fro m the beginning: how can the power which socie ty exercises over the
individual consciousness be explained a nd how may it be justified? Durkheim tries to solve this problem which the crisis of
contemporary society poses by pursuing the social origin of religion , which , at an early stage in the development of society ,
provided a bindin g solutio n to this very proble m in a form wh ich
does not of course appear adequate to t he scie ntific mind of the
modern world.
To comprehend the social phe nomena of today (0 the extent necessary to
d irect their further development, is it no t su fficient to observe them as
they occur in our present experience? .. This sw ift process is, howe\·er.
riddled with deception . One does no t know social reality if one has o nl y
viewed it from the outside and witho ut knowing what underlies it. To
know how it is made up, one must know how it was formed . ... To be
able to say with some ho pe of success what wi ll be and what the society of
tomor row will be like, it is essen tial to examine first the social fo rms of the
most distant past. To understand the present one must leave it.

The a nswers which Du r khe im fo und in this roundabom way
have up to t his d ay weighed heavily o n the researc h which he thus
inaugu ntted
.
In the summation of his sociology, the stud y o n the
Elnnenwry FQnns of Religious Life, he arrives a t the alienating
conclusion that, in all forms of expression o f the religious life,
society itself presents itself to the individual in its "sanctity" and
that this ca pacity of society for self-de ification might possibly be a
source of moral rene wal for mode rn socie ty, This was objected to
as meta physics and , late r, in the light of fasc ism, as a subservie nce
to autho rity a nd naive trust in t he collective being levelled at him

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol22/iss22/2
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and his school. Raymond Aron and Theodor W. Adorno have
argued thus.
When this reproach of spiritual affi nity to fascism was firsl
made in the thirties. twenty years after Durkheim's death in 1917.
Marcel Mau ss replied as fo llows:
Ourkheim, and. after him, the remainder of our circle were those who. I
believe, de\'eloped the theory of the authOlity of thc collectivc imagination. Something which we did not really foresee was that man y large
modern societies which more or less emerged from the Middle Ages
could be hypnotized just like the Australians in their dances. (... ) This
return to the primitive was nOI part of our intention . We restricted
ourselves to hinlS at mass situations, whereas, in reality. it was a question
of somet hing else. We restricted ourselves, too, to showing that the
individual can find the basis and support for his freedom , his independence, his per.sonality and his criticism in the spirit of the collective.
Basically, we did not make allowance for the extraordinary new possibilities (.. .). I belie\'e that all this is a gen uine trdgedy for us, a 100
powerful coming true of things which we had referred to, and the p roof
that we should have expected their coming true in e \·il rather than in

good'

What th is return to the primitive in t he research directions in
the Durkheim circle implies only becomes clear in these last
jud gments which Durkheim believed he COuld justifiably make
o n the basis of his research in the sociology of religion. Marcel
Mauss is a rel iable witness to the movement which he helped
in itiate and to this heritage of which he continued to adm in ister
after Durkheim's death, How dose he was to Durkheim is apparent from his biograph y. He was Durkheim's nephew, fourteen
years you nger than him , bo rn in 1872 in the same locality in the
Vosges, and it seems right to assume that his break with the
tradition of a pious J ewish family boasting several rabbis d id not
come about withou t the influence of his unde , who began to teach
pedagogy and sociology in Bordeaux in the eighties. Mauss
studied philosophy in Bordeaux under Durkheim's su pervision
before turning to the history of religion , Indology and other
philological d isciplines. The combination of historical, philological and ethnological interests made Mauss s upre~el y suited to
collaborate o n the period ical Annee Sociologique with which Durkhe im strived to provide a n annual assessment of sociologically
relevam mate rial from neighbouring disciplines, especialJy the
historical scie nces, a nd a critical assessment of illlernationally
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1990
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riva lin g sociological and social-philosoph ical theories in a closer
sense. From the very beginning, the aim was to extend the object

of study o f sociology, or, expressed differently. to sociologize the
neighbouring d isciplines.
The most important result of this programme may be termed
a n "ethnological revolution" within the sociology of the Durkhe im school.Levi-Strauss has pointed out that in TIle Rules of
Sociological Methods, Durkheim is still mistrustfu l of ethnographic
literature, the "confused and neeting observations" of which he
regards as inferior to the "precise texts o f history." And Mauss,
too, a nd his colleague, Hubert. adopt this judgment in their study
of the sacrifice when they regard the facts assembled by e thnographists as being distorted by fleeting observations and fa lsified
by being translated into the "exactness of our language." Yet they
are not led to devalue these documents, but lOchange their way of
viewing them; historical a nd ethnographical sources are not to be
used to illustrate a developmem schema and a genesis of the
sacrifice , but should enable the schema. or, as we should probably
say today, the structure of the institution of sacrifice to be recognized. Ethnological and historical sources are here o f equal value.
The new methodological conviction which emerges from the
revaluation of the relationsh ip of ethnograph y and history is
summed up by Ourkheim in a revision of his own earlier judgment:
Nothing, then. is more unjust than the disdain with which all too many
historians still treat the work of C!thnogrdphC!rs. The opposite has in fact
proved to be true: that ethnography has most frequen tly led to the most
fruitful rC\'olutions in the various branches of sociology.

Primitive civilizations for Durkheim and his circle became
"privileged cases. because they are simple cases." One mayjustifiably ask if this supJX>sed simplicity is not a deception to be attributed rather to the change in the observer's perspective than to
properties of primitive societies. They are, as I..kvi-Strauss stresses
in an appr.aisal of Ourkhe im's contribution to ethnology, no
longer object of a quaint curiosity which feels attracted to the
strangeness and bizarre nature of its discoveries, nor do they
provide more examples for speculative hypotheses on the origin
and developmem of mankind. Inne r-theoretical motifs in Durkbcimian sociology-especially its interest in the sociological dehttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol22/iss22/2
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termining of the function of religion-shed new light on the
ethnographical faclS. T hey now become eleme nlS in a type of
experimenml set-up for an analysis of elementary social, fu nctional relationships, and, as such, acquire a new a uthenticity. In
additio n , the new ethnographical literature which is now taken
note of can, in ilS empirical abundance, no longer be fitted coherendy into sim ple schemas of stages and sllb-stages of social evolution . The re-orientation thus necessitated is ex pressed more
freely in Mauss' work than in that of Ourkheim himself, whose
co ncep tio n of logical simp licity rema ins determined by
developmental-historical thinking; it is, as it were, its logical distillation. Mauss, o n the Olher hand, declares as early as 1902 on
acceptin g the chai rof"the history of the religion of non-civilized
peoples" that there are no non-civilized peoJ5le, onJy people of
"different" civilizations, and that the religious phenomena o bserved by ethnologists in Australia are neither simple nor primitive. On ly later do the implications of this outline come to fruition
in Mauss' own work, in his sketch of a theory of civilization , in
which he supports the very modern view that every civilization
chose from a pool of different possibilities, or in the anthropology
of Levi-Strauss, which regards itself as a theory of civi lisational
difference.
Theethno logical revolution shows itself in sociologybut sketchilyat first. It is not a turning towards genuine ethnography as
introduced by Malinowski with his demand for full participation
in the life a nd thoug ht of natives. but it presenlS itself as the
introduction of direct obse rvation in the relationshipofproblems
with a h igh degree of abstraction and factual data and of extremely indirect provenance. The observation and description
demanded and practised by Mauss is that of a theoretician in
search of an authentic reality of just those social experiences
which a re intangible and of conceptual images which are hard to
grasp.
Even where Mauss comes closest to a genuine ethnographical
description of a conc rete societ y, as in his essay on Seasonal Change
in Eslcimo Societies, he does so in the mode of [he "as if:' It is an
ethnography of ethnograph ies. The enure literature on Eskimos
available to Mauss in 1904 is, as it were, layered into a model of
what in the Durkheim school goes under the newly-coined term
of "social morphology;' namely:
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1990
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the material substrate of societies (... ). thai is, the form which they
assume when they seule in a terriLOI)'. the size and density orlhe popula.
tio n, the way in which it is distributed, and also the ensemble of things in
which the collective life is situated.'

What Mauss discovers in his description of Eskimo societies ac·

cording to these criteria is {he fact of a double morphology of li fe
in the winter quarters and the sum mer e ncam pments which is not

on ly an expression of external requiremems and needs , but in
which someth ing like a general rhythm of social life is represented. Mauss finds that
the people group themselves in two differcm ways, and that 10 these
group forms correspond two legal syste ms, two moralities and two ty~s
of household and of religious life. Opposed to a real community of ideas
and intests
re existing in the dose conglomeratio n of the winter, and a
strong religious, moral and spiritual unit y, are Ihe isolation , fragi le social
relationships and an extreme moral and religious impoverishment in the
summer dispersal.'G

The pathos of intensive observation of this case of a double
morphology brought about by many conditions of an external
nature is discernibly detennined by "what is happening around
us in our western societies" without its there attainin g the degree
of crystallization in the observer's field . Is not li fe in these societies
equally subject to rhythmic fluctuations, the diversion of the
su mmer in the holidays after which
life (tries] to pick itself up again and with ascending motio n [con tinues]
regu larly until June only to collapse into itself one more ... "

and is it not a general law that social life does not remain at the
same p itch during different seasons of t he year
bUl (...) (goes through] regularly consecutive phases of waxing and
waning intensity of rest and activity, of exhaustion and recupeT3.tion?'1

Hand in hand with the peacefu l observation of the model case of
Eskimo societies goes a disquiet, hard to define, ste mming from
the social experience of the observer caught up in the tension of
collective compulsions and an individual need to withdraw, and
simultaneously in the tens ion of individuaJ isolation and the need
for the excesses of collective life . This opposition, not to speak of
ambivale nce. is characteristic of all the theoretical efforts of the
sociology of the Durkheim school and has given rise to endless

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol22/iss22/2
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discussions o f individualism and collectivism. Ye t one will hardly
find another sentence wh ich expresses this in so untroubled a nd
sober a way as the following occasional re ma rk in Mauss' essay on
Eskimo socie ties :
O nc may say that sociale lif
cisesexer
a power o\·er the organism and the
consciousness of the individual wh ich they can only bear for a certain
length of time, and that a point comes to where they a re forced to slow it
down and parr.ially to withdraw from i(.13

T he ethnological observation prac t ised by Mauss pa sses
through several layers of the given da ta, First it is directed at
what-in the case of magic practices and sac rificial rituals-may
be obtained from a uthentic documents, ideally from eye·w itness
testimony (the a uthors of which are themselves agents), from
events, sequences of activity, and things accessible to simple de·
scriptio n . In and t h rough t his descriptio n an a tte mpt is made to
g rasp a second level, which Mauss in his analysis oftlle sacrifice as
a unified sacrificial syste m de fin es as the binding mechanism
relating things, ideas and actions to each other. The description
of t he sacrifice a nd of magic in their typical milieu , practices a nd
structures is, howeve r, always also the attempt at a description of
something e lse. In his Oldiine of a Ce·neral Th eory of Magic Mauss
defines the real o bject of research as the description o f what
cannot be clearly conceived of:
ideas fro m ,,,.. hich we thought ourselves freed and which consequently we
can imagine only with diffIC ulty (.. .) dark and blurred and yet strangely
eno ugh clearly deli ned in their use (.. .) abstract and general a nd ye t full
of the concrete. Their original. lhat is to S.lY lheircomplex and con fused
natu re, forbids us carryi ng O UI a logical analysis. We mUSI restrict o urselves to d escribing them.'·

This description , or an uncertain attempt a t it, is admittedly
undertake n in the expectation of progressing to a differellliogic
or to a non· intellectu
al
or individualistic p sychology which can
explain a nd integrate operations otherwise difficult to grasp. The
concre te ethnological observations of the Durkheim school proceed very rapidly to facto rs which it rega rds as lyin g deeper tha n
that wh ich is accessible to introspective reflection. Mauss s peaks
very early o n of unconscious ideas being determinant in magic,
religion and linguistics. References suc h as these re main , how·
e ver, in Ma uss' work te ntat ive efforts to extricate himself from

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1990
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socio logical ex planatory sche mas o f Durkheimian provenance.
Resorting to the collective conscio usness as the real agent in all
those fonn s of expression of social life which a p pear overpowerfu l as o p posed to the individ ual and the modes o f thought
and activity wh ich hecan readily comprehend is clearly noticeable
he re as in h ibiting the search for othe r fo r ms of e xplan atio n .
The situation brought about by the e thno logical re volutio n is
no t witho ut paradoxical features. It had been mad e JX>ssible at a
point in t ime whe n it beg-dO to be su pposed that religio n , whic h
orders all thin gs and processes into sacred and p rofane. could be
comple tely ex plained as a p rojection of the social. Sho uld no t,
t he n , so-called p rimitive societies be regarded as simple mod els
for the mecha nism o f the social, which , in however fantastic a nd ,
for the mode rn individual consciousness, unintelligble, fo rm, is
free ly revealed as working cont inuo usly in suc h societies? T hus, it
was ofte n rightly said withifl the circle of Durkhe im's s upporters
t hat pri mitive societies we re the parad ise o f the collective conscious ness whe re its rule was indisputable a nd it neither met with
nor to le rated resistance . But, via the e thnographical obse rvation
o f p ri mitive socie ties, the image of the effective fun ctional relat ionshi ps p resent in the m was e nriched to the ex te nt t hat the
exp la na tion fo unded on collective con sciousness lost its bite. or
itself req ui red to be further diffe rentia ted. It is a t t his intersect io n
tha t Ma uss' stud ies o n the histo r y o f religio n may be situ ated , a nd
t hey seem to be, despite the richness o f the rela tionship of ritual
fo rms, myths, religions, ideas and · !IOC
ial fo rms whic h he ma kes
accessible to description , obstr ucted by sociological ex pla na tion .
T h is can be clearly fel t e ve n in ex p ressio ns which a ttem pt to
p reserve the ide ntity of the sacred a nd the social against the
com ple x inte r-rel atedness o f t he real a nd intellectual milieu of
religio n :
T he sacred thi ngs are social things (... ) In our opinion everything may
be understood as holy which qualifies society for the group and its
me mbers. Whe n the gods, each at their appointed hou r, lea\'e the temple
and become profane, we see human and social things entering one after
the other, the fatherland. property, work. the human person (.. ,).
Be hind [the idea of the sacred andl the ideas of separ.Ition, clea nliness
n, rejectio anxiety, various strong,
and uncleanliness. lie respect, love,
mood-laden emotions, which, by their \'ery nature, insist on being translated into gestures and thoughts. T he concept [of the sacred] is more

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol22/iss22/2

12

Ritter: The Ethnological Revolution: On Marcel Mauss
Nnllling Riller

1$

complex. richer, more general a nd practical than it first seemed . It is
without doubt the itlieforce around which rites and myths order them-It
selves. re vealed itself to us as the cent ... 1 phenomenon of all religious
phenomena. We set ourselves the task of understanding it and of verify.
ing what we have said about the idemity of the sacred and the social.

The central phenomenon of the saCl"ed . the unity of a n idea
and its expressive po..... er (..... hat Ma uss, with idiosyncratic term inology, here calls idiejorce ), stands in need of explanation , a
de mand for explanation which, obscured as it is by Mauss'
sociological explanation, cannot be mel. For it is able to name only
episodic co nditions under which idea and expressive force
coalesce.
The parallel case of Mauss' theory of magic allows this to be
shown more clearly. After describing the logkof magic. which is a
logic of desire , replacing reality by wishful think.in g, Mauss has
the sign create the th in g. the part the whole, the word the event.
his sociological explanation pointing to collective states in which
such violation s of the customary rules of logic and individual
psychology a re possible.
The whole social ixKIy is brought to life by a si ngle movement. There are
no longer individ uals. They are. as it were, parts of a machine. or. even
belter. the spokes of a wheel, the magiC'dl dancing and singing revolutions of which might perhaps be the ideal. original image which e\'e n
today recur
s in the cases we have named, and elsewhere. Its rh ythmic.
regular and continuo us movement is the direct expression of the state o f
mind in which the consciousness of each individual is overwhelmed by a
single feeli ng, by a single hallucinatory idea, namel y t hat of a COm !nOn
aim. All the bodies vibrate at Ihe same pitch. all faces wear the same mask,
and all voices arc a single cry, quite apart from the deep impression made
by the beat. the music and the song. T o see the image of llis desire in all
phenomenon, 10 hear fro m e\'ery mouth the proof of its certainty, each
individual is without any possible resistance, carried away by the conviction of all. Thrown ra ndom ly together in the movement Oflhe dance and
in the fe\'erofthei rexcitement, the y form but a single body and a single
soul. Only then is social body tnlly realized, for al this mo ment its cells.
the individuals. are perhapsjust as liltle isolated fro m each o ther as those
of the individual organism. Under such conditions, v.'hich are no longer
realized in our societies even by the most agitated of our masses, but
"'hich C HI still quite possibly be found elsewhere, the universal consensus
creates realities. (.. .) The laws of collective psychology here violate those
of individual psychology. The whole range of phenomena which normally occur consecutively. acts of wilL thought. muscular movements,
need-satisf
action,
thus becomes absolutely si multaneous. I S
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One can easily recognize that here sociological explanation
becomes vacuous. What the ethno logical revolution had brought
of value to sociology, enrichmenllhrough the experience of other
social forms foreign to o ur society. and the differentiated opera-

tions of their "logic," is sacrificed in such passages to an overquick, pseudo-sociological explanation. For either primitive

societies are, in their non-acutely-agitated, normal Slate, just
r igid , veiled forms of collective madness, or the explanatio n

drawn on he re isj uslas incapabJeof comprehend ing their normal
state as that of our own society, which, at the time when Mauss
wrote this-in t he year 1902-be lieved itself safe from all acute
collective madness.
What by description was wrenched from the sphere of disdain,
magical operations unintelligible to us, sacrificial acts oscillating
between violence and its transcendence, is, in passages like these,
thrust back into confusion and incompre hensibil ity. It is the moment of incantation in sociology itself at wh ich we are presentt he incantation of the origin of collective logic and the logic of the
social from t he agitation of the mass. The agitation of the description , however, is the agitation of the describing socio logist who
believes himself present at t he genesis of categories which are not
furt her analyzable.
Levi-Su"'<luSS spoke of a "bottleneck" in Mauss' think.ing which
he could not negotiate:
like Moses, who led his people to the frontier of the promised land, the
splendour of which he himself never saw. There must somewhere be a
decisive bonlcneck which Mauss has never negotiated and which without
doubt can explain why the novum organum of the social sciences of the
20th cenwry which o ne could have expected from him and all the
threads of which he held in his hand never saw the light of day except in
the form of fragments. I I

The "promised land" into which the structuralist Levi-Strauss
leads the social scie nces of the 20th celllury is the theory of the
unconscious and of the logic of the symbolic function of the
human mind. In fact, it is a simple turning which Uvi-Strauss
gives to Mauss' insights: if it is not possible to explain sociologically the thought systems and practices described by Mauss other
than by resorting to confused, all-embracing affective Slales, then
the socio logical explanation itself must be abandoned. Uvihttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol22/iss22/2
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Strauss came to this conclusion before his first structural studies
on kinship-systems were published, and it may be made plausible
even without the new theoretical set of instruments, even if its
fru itfulness cannot yet be tested. It is the consequence of the
fai led attempts of the Durkheim school to explain the genesis of
symbolic thought from its social functions, and proceeds instead
from the premise that the human potential for using symools in
society is a fact with no further derivation:
Sociology cannot explain the genesis of symbolic thought; it must take it
as given. (... ) Society cannot exist wi thout symbols [one must] show how
theemergence of symbolic thought makes social life at o ne and ule same
lime both possible and necessary.

There are ma ny passages in Mauss' work which point foreward
to this position without, however, adopting it. He postulates a
"non-intellectual psychology" which enables the European, malured to reason , to understand foreign categories: he sees the
common element, the unconscious ideas, at work in magic, religion and lingu istics. He notes the linguistic similarity between the
social facts which he is stud ying; and occasionally his thou ghts
revo lve around the concept of the unconscious without, however,
naming it. In very difficult, groping terms he tries to determine
the relationship of language and society without being able to
loosen the knot of enmeshed relations between linguistic and
social facts. One must, to a certain extent, follow Mauss' mode of
expression in o rder to recognize the barriers which prevented
h im from taking the structuralist way out. In the essay on the
"Structuring of Sociology" published in 1927 Mauss regards as a
weakness of the Durkheim school its neglect of technical, aesthetic and above all linguistic phenomena. For it is in language really
that all other ulterances and activities of society find expression.
an d primarily they are transmitted linguistically. In language lie
most of the concepts and ordering of the collective, which does
not, however, mean that there is nothing in society which does not
translate into words: on the contrary, there are categories of
thought which without grammatical, logical or any expressive
correspondences g uide a whole range of actions and ideas, and
are, as it were, active in mythology and philosoph y, in the technical division of labour, and even in the ordering of things and
persons.
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Nowhere does Mauss perhaps come closer to Levi·Strauss; yet
he withdraws from this advanced position considering that. even
if the social need not necessarily represent itself consciously or
verbally, everything verbal is in any case conscious and social. Still
more imponam seems to him the fact that everything ve rbal has,
more strongly than all other collective practices or ideas, the
specific quality o~ isolating even civilization and society by iLS
belonging LO a specific community. The linguistic belongs simultaneously to the order of the general and the particular. for it is
general for all individuals belonging to the language com munity.
but it is o nly common to them, and each ind ividual individualizes
linguislicexpression in his usage. Language is, then, the common
and, as it were, natural means by which thought and action are
represented . It has. however, at the same time in its individual use
the characteristic of the artificial and arbitrary. This dual nature
of linguistic expression has for Mauss its roots in the relationshp
of idea and action within social consciousness, a problem of which
he says that no one has previously dared to approach, and the
posing of which will not perhaps be possible so soon.
One can only speculate as to how Mauss would have judged the
structuralist solution to this problem and whethe r he wo uld have
accepted it at all. At the highest stage of abstraction to which
Mauss theoretically attained. he expressly excluded the possibility
of a general solu tion to the problem of the relationship between
idea and action, the notion of a common anthropological root of
the synthesis which is represented in social institut ions and
thought systems, and this he does in argument with which. from
the perspective of his successors, he is already moving in the midst
of structuralism :
There is a deep-lying property common to aU social phenomena and
appearing even in those which are not only characteristic of a single
society but of several societies o f greater or lesser number having su r\'ived a more or less long time. Every social phroolmtlon has in fact an
essential propeny: whether it is a symbol. a word. an instrume nt, an
institution. or even language itself o r the most de\'eloped o f sciences.
whether it is the instrument beSt ada pted to the beSt and most purposes.
whether it is as reasonable and human as most possible-it is still arbitrary.
All social phenomena are, to a certaindegr<:e, the work of the collective
wiU and whoever speaks of the human ,""ill means the choice of various
possible options. A certain thing. a story. a word , a certai n way of
cultivating the soil , the inner or o uter structure ofa house. a \'essel,a tool,
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everyth ing has a type and a mode of its ow n a.nd in many cases
supple mentary [0 its own nature and primary form, its own mode of use.
The social is the sphere of modality."
I n this sphere o f modality of the " how" of the concrete expression
of social behaviour a nd of general social forms and functional
relationshps Mauss has moved as a n eminent observer riskin g
e rror, against which his unbounded c uriosity can on ly defend
itselfhy no t pausing. When he divides up ci vilizations into those in
which children are brought up with or without cradles, those in
which food is ea ten with o r without salt, then these are small
darin g o bservatio ns, but also ma rking points left behind during
the 5\",i(t traverse o f unknown terrain. If one day- and o nl y in
t hi s indeterminacy d id Ma u ss fo r esee the future o f hi s
research-there sho uld be a scie nce of man, then it sho uld take
account o f s uch markers, perhaps re-siling them, but in a n y case
achieving s uch a union of the ge neral a nd the concrete.
Ber/in and halik/uri
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